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Abstract—the globalization of trade is due to the 
transportation possibilities and the standardization 
(containerization of freight).  The dependency of the economy to 
the sea and to the merchant navy has increase this last decade. 
This process forms a worldwide maritime network between the 
different locations of production and consumption. This network, 
representing between 80 % and 90% of world traffic is a major 
economic concern, including freight distribution, raw materials 
or energy. Rodrigue demonstrates[1] the  economic dependency 
of energy is increasing in the industrialized countries (North 
America, Europe, East Asia). The inter-regional trade of oil was 
31 million bbl/day in 2002 and is expected to grow up to 57 
bbl/day in 2030 [2]. Most of the international traffic use a 
maritime way, where may occur disruptions. For example, the 
Suez crisis (1956-1957) caused a closure of the canal, reducing 
the throughput capacity of transportation. This disruption cost a 
2 millions of barrels lost per day. This article focuses on 
vulnerability of the energy supply, and proposes a methodology 
to formalize and assess the vulnerability of the network by taking 
into account the spatial structure of maritime territories. 
Keywords — maritime network, maritime territories, network 
modelling, maritime safety and security.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, the supply chain of energy has a global dimension, 
connecting major consumers (East-Asia, North America) to 
major producers (Middle-East, Russia). Most of this trade is 
done on the maritime territories, which represent 40% of the 
supply of petroleum and 25% of gaz (Institut Supérieur 
d’Economie Maritime). The energy security is a major issue 
for global economy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
defined energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price” [2]. To ensure the 
security of the supply chain, the understanding of possible 
disruptions is necessary. The aim of IEA is to “maintain and 
improve systems for coping with oil supply disruptions”. The 
severity of a disruption can be measured by energy lost, level 
of commercial inventories, the duration of the disruption and 
the available spare production capacity. Disruptions on the 
supply chain can be due to environmental causes (extreme 
weather conditions), maritime activities (collisions, 
infrastructures failures) or deliberate acts like piracy and 
terrorist attack. To ensure theses disruptions, two emergency 
responses are used by IEA, the increase of supply, by 
stockdraw and production surge, and demand reducing, by 
restraint and switching energy type.  This network can be 
model by the use of graph. 
 
Indeed, geography and spatial reasoning can highlight new 
knowledge about supply chain security. The aim of this work 
is to propose a methodology to formalize and asses the 
vulnerability of the network by the access of spatial 
possibilities offered by ocean spatial structure. To achieve it, a 
state of the art of different modelling of network is detailed in 
Section II. Then, Section III describes the spatial structure of 
the ocean and effects of “territorialization” on maritime 
territories. Section IV focus on vulnerability measurement of 
the network. Section V presents the methodology and the 
different steps to assess the vulnerability. Finally, the paper 
ends with a discussion on the further works.  
 
II. GRAPH THEORY AND MARITIME NETWORK 
MODELLING 
 
Modelling the supply chain by a network offers several 
advantages. Graphs can describe the topological relation 
existing between consumers and production through space and 
quantifies the flow of energy with a ponderation of the graph. 
This section first describes the properties of graphs then the 
existing modelling of maritime network and these limitations 
to access vulnerability.   
 
A. Properties of graphs  
 
Graph theory is mainly used for network modeling. Most of the 
studies on maritime networks use graph theory. Indeed, 
network analysis is used to studyy transport network forms and 
structures[1]. Networks are modelled by graphs for several 
reasons:  
• The main strength of graph theory is to allow the 
description of the topological relationship between 
several nodes, describing links between locations. 
This allows studying the connectivity and the degree 
distribution of every location in a topological space. 
Those concepts are essential for the study of 
networks. 
• In the case of spatial network the vector and 
geometric proprieties are very useful. Vectors 
properties are used to add a direction to a link. For 
transportation modelling, this property is used to 
model flows between locations. Geometrics properties 
can be used to insert distance into the model. This 
allows spatializing the network in a Euclidian space. 
It is essential for the modelling of transport. 
• Graph theory allows also the description of 
relationships through the graph. These properties 
based on the concept of path (a course between 
components into the graph) and cycle (a path have the 
same origin and destination) allow the study of 
relationships between various parts of the graphs.  
Theses mathematical properties of graphs are primarily used 
for the static and dynamic modelling of a transport network.  
 
B. Maritime network modelling 
 
Few works have been done on modeling of maritime 
networks. These studies focus on several research questions 
on maritime network modelling:  
 
• The topological properties of the network and 
formalization of these transportation networks.  Most 
of them use nodes as ports and links as a maritime 
flow between ports.  
 
• The configuration of the maritime network and its 
relationship with the land areas. 
 
• The identification of groups (global regions, 
clusters…) into the maritime network. 
  
Joly[3] was the first to model the maritime networks using 
graph theory, with data from the Naval Llyod’s insurance 
company. Each point corresponds to a port, each relation to a 
link. Veenstra et al.[4] model the maritime networks in three 
levels: the first level corresponds to infrastructure (ports), the 
second level corresponds to the ports used by shipping lines 
and the third one to quantification of the previous levels (e.g. 
transported volumes, frequencies of transport). The goal of 
their research is to measure the attractiveness of a port within 
a network. The purpose of the study of Hu and Zhu [5] is to 
demonstrate that the shape of global maritime network is a 
"network of small world" which is characterized by the 
presence of cliques (a sub-graph where all the nodes are 
connected) and “scale free”, following a power law, with high 
degrees of correlation nodes (hubs) and lower ones (spokes). 
Ducruet[6] models the network with a multigraph. The result 
is a hierarchy of ports and shipping lines depending of nodal 
regions. Zavitsas[7] proposes a model to determine the 
vulnerability of the maritime supply chain. His methodology 
consists to create a grid on the maritime space and simulate 
paths by a shortest path algorithm to obtain a network. Xu et 
al.[8] propose a network based by grouping seaboards to 
analyze the evolution of the maritime network between 
different parts of the world. Kaluza et al.[9] propose a model 
to compare the different network forms by ships type 
(container ships, bulk dry carriers, oil tankers…).  
 
All of these modelling are illustrated in (Fig. 1). The figure 
compares the different structure of maritime network proposed 
in scientific papers.  Circles represent maritime space, nodes 
the different locations linked (ports for most of them) and 
links the structuration of network. Links differentiation 
correspond to  the 3 levels of network in Veenstra et al[4] 
modelling and different type of ships into Kaluza et al[9] 
modelling. 
 
Figure 1. Maritime network modelling using graph theory 
 
C. Limitation of these works in our case study 
 
However, these works are limited to provide useful 
information for safety and security on the sea. These models 
provide any information on the maritime territory crossed by 
ships. Indeed, the proposed models use ports as nodes and 
links as roads. The only exceptions are some checkpoints such 
as channels (Suez, Panama) used in the model of Ducruet [6] 
 
In his modelling, Zavitsas[7] uses the shortest route between 
the port of departure (supply) and arrival (demand) through a 
cost-distance matrix and justifies this choice by the lack of 
available information on maritime territory. Veenstra et al [4] 
don’t model the sea routes because they do not consider the 
maritime space as a physical space "There are no physical 
links between airports and between seaports that have the 
characteristic of a line". The work of Hu & Zhu[5] only 
focuses on the shape of the maritime network and do 
abstraction of space. 
 
A spatial reasoning about the space crossed by ships is 
missing or not covered in the existing works on maritime 
flows modelling. Due to the specific research question behind 
these modelling, mainly focuses on relationship between 
ports, maritime territories are not present into the conceptual 
framework. Indeed, there are no modelling approach who tries 
to understand the relationship between transportation and the 
spatial structure of the ocean. But ocean isn’t an empty and 
homogeneous place. Moreover, to measure the vulnerability 
by topological and geometric features, a specific model of 
maritime space is needed. Indeed, measure the influence of 
ports between them and their topological properties is not 
sufficient under this research.  
 
To obtain this model, it will be necessary to integrate the 
structuring elements of maritime territory in the previous 
section to formalize a network capable of representing the 
topology of the maritime area. The problematic of this study is 
to find a new methodology to build this network, and 
understand relationships between the economical use of ocean 
(the maritime network) and the structuration of maritime space 
(maritime territories). Our hypothesis is that dynamic structure 
of maritime space under the effect of risky situations may 
induce disruptions on the network, and affects the 
performance of the supply chain of energy. 
 
3 TERRITORIALIZATION AND SPATIAL STRUCTURATION OF 
MARITIME SPACE 
 
Our goal in this work is to formalize a network based on the 
spatial structure of ocean. To achieve it, we have to 
understand how the maritime territories are forms. Indeed, 
through these maritime territories, the maritime network is 
forms by the used of space into the maritime territories. With 
this methodology, we can understand the structuration of the 
maritime network. 
 
A. Typology of network by structuration 
 
Three types of network are distinguish depending to their 
spatial structuration[1]:  strictly defined and delimited, 
vaguely defined and delimited, or immaterial. In a strictly 
defined and delimited network, the space occupied by the 
transportation network is strictly reserved for the use of 
transport and can be identified on a map. An appropriation of 
this space for transportation purposes can be established, the 
network structure is dependent on infrastructure. This is the 
case of road and rail networks. In the vaguely defined and 
delineated networks, as maritime and aerial networks, the 
space can be shared by multiple activities, there is no 
appropriation of space, only rights of way. Infrastructures are 
exclusively areas of departure and arrival. Finally, some 
networks, such as wireless communication networks are 
immaterial and have no spatiality 
 
In the case of maritime transportation, the possibility of the 
maritime space isn’t constraint by an infrastructure and can 
use all the opportunities available at sea.  
 
B. Spatial propriety of maritime space 
 
Between ports, the network crosses maritime space, which 
corresponds to the entire ocean. This space may be considered 
by its topological properties, connexity and connectivity: 
 
• Connexity means that the maritime space does not 
have any discontinuity within its space and maritime 
space therefore is totally connected. This means that 
from a port, it is theoretically possible to reach all the 
other ports.  
 
• Connectivity is measured by the degree of freedom 
(k) is theoretically infinite as the ocean is not limited 
by a network-support (as is the case for road or rail) 
and therefore, there is an infinite number of ways to 
connect the ports (Fig. 2)  
 
 
Figure 2. Connectivity of maritime space 
 
However, this degree of freedom is only theoretical, because 
in practice other structural logics (e.g economical, legal) are 
sea routes and spatial constraints for the transportation within 
the maritime space. 
 
C. Territorialization and spatial constaints  
 
This process of maritimization has an impact on maritime 
spaces. This increasing use of space as for transport and 
exploitation has resulted in a territorialization of maritime 
spaces. Di Meo[10] defines the concept of territory, 
distinguishing its two components: an infrastructure and a 
superstructure. Infrastructure refers to concrete aspects of 
territories:  it consists of a geographical instance through the 
construction of concrete space (ports, off-shore structures ...) 
and economic proceeding involves a spatial organization of 
transportation and exploitation in the territory. These instances 
are managed by the superstructure, consisting in a 
representation of the territory and a political and legal case 
involving power over the space considered, at the same time 
international (Montego Bay convention) and national (e.g. 
EEZ, territorial seas). 
 
This territorialization process forms geographical, legal and 
economic constraints, related to maritime territories. 
Constraints are formalized as barriers on the maritime network 
and explain the overall structure of the maritime network. 
Rodrigue[1] distinguishes two types of barriers for transport 
networks: the absolute and relative barriers. 
 
The absolutes barriers prevent all movements within the 
network. In a maritime network, this is the land/sea interface 
which corresponds to the limit of the maritime space. Indeed, 
the land/sea interface is a discontinuity and therefore is 
characterized by an impassable limit. 
 
Relative barriers reduce and restrict the degree of freedom and 
the space connectivity. Thus, they affect the routes used to 
connect two parts of the network. They correspond to the 
capes, straits, channels, iceberg, restricted area, weather, and 
any element affecting the freedom of use in maritime space.  
 
These structural elements (physical constraints and political 
boundaries) explain the configuration of maritime lines 
between the ports. Indeed, they have an influence by degree of 
constraint on the maritime network structure.    
 
IV.  NETWORK VULNERABILITY MEASUREMENT 
 
The structure of the maritime network has an impact on the 
maritime network vulnerability. The main problematic of 
transport network is the accessibility of locations. This 
accessibility is measured by the degree of connectivity into the 
network. To assess the vulnerability of a network, several 
indicators are used. 
 
A. Typology of vulnerability measurements 
 
Connective and access vulnerability, robustness and reliability 
are the three mains indicators to measure the impact of 
disruptions. These three concepts are complementary and rely 
on different conceptualizations of network security: 
 
1) Connective and access vulnerability 
Zavitsas[7] defined network vulnerability both as a probability 
of occurrence of a disruption on a network and as a degree of 
degradation resulting in a performance drop once the 
disruption performed.  
 
The two fundamentals notions to measure the vulnerability are 
accessibility and connectivity. D'Este and Taylor[11] 
differentiate the "connective vulnerability" and "access 
vulnerability". The connective vulnerability involves the 
configuration of the links. It is related to the extension of the 
shortest paths, a link between two nodes is vulnerable when 
the degradation following a disruption increases the cost of 
travel between two nodes. The access vulnerability focus on 
nodes in the graph: a node is vulnerable if a disruption greatly 
reduces its accessibility. 
 
2) Robustness 
Robustness refers to the network's ability to normally function 
despite a malfunction of a component following a disruption 
[12]. Static robustness refers to the ability to maintain 
connectivity after random removal of part of the network. 
Dynamic robustness is interested in redistribution of flows 
after a disruption.  
 
3) Reliability 
Reliability is a user-oriented view of vulnerability. The most 
common definition is from Wakabayshi and Iida [13] which is 
the probability that the system works properly for a period 
when the user tries to use the system. 
 
B. A structural vulnerability of transport networks 
 
The work of Gleyze[14] distinguishes the different aspects of 
the vulnerability of a network. This work is interesting for our 
research because the conceptual framework used in this work 
isolates structural measurement for the network. 
 
Gleyze[14] identifies three parts in the vulnerability of 
networks: the material part, the structural part and the 
functional part. The material part refers to the potential of the 
network infrastructure damage (e.g. roads, railways, stations, 
ports), the structural aspect determines the network relational 
(ability to connect each part of the network) and the functional 
aspect indicates the vulnerability for the transportation 
services offered by the network. These three vulnerabilities 
are linked, for example, if a road is vulnerable to a flood 
(material vulnerability), it will directly affect the potential of 
the relational network (structural vulnerability) and therefore 
the use of the network (functional vulnerability). 
 
This distinction isolates the spatial structure through the 
conceptualization of the notion of structural vulnerability. The 
network is described as a mediator, a relational object linking 
different parts of the ocean (in this case of study). Through 
this conceptual framework, we can use spatial properties on 
the network (topology, geometric) to measure the network 
vulnerability.  
 
C. Measurement of network efficacity and solicitation 
 
Gleyze uses two main measures to determine the structural 
vulnerability: network efficiency, which is the degree of 
degradation of the disruption, and the network solicitation, 
which is the structural response of the network use after a 
disruption. 
 
The network efficiency measures vulnerability facing network 
disruption by the degradation of effectiveness at local and 
global levels. The average distance is used to measure for each 
given component its accessibility. In case of disruption, 
overall efficiency is calculated by the additional length 
(distance, time or cost) to connect all points of the network. 
 
The second measure used is the network solicitation. It allows 
the understanding of the impact of a disruption in terms of 
redistribution of relationships on the network.  It measures the 
total weight of the shortest paths on each component. After a 
disruption, it can distinguish which component will be 
solicited and therefore how the network uses the structure to 
respond to the disruption. 
 
This conceptual framework and associated measurements are 
useful in our work. Nevertheless, to use the concept and 
measurement of structural vulnerability, we have to adapt 
them to our specific study case. Gleyze work focuses on urban 
networks but maritime transportation has is own specificity: 
the transportation possibilities are not a set of way but a 
surface with infinite deviational possibilities. To obtain an 
assessment of maritime network, we have to propose a model 
taking into account theses specificities.  
 
V.  MODELLING THE MARITIME NETWORK VULNERABILITY 
 
The territorialization of maritime space results in a spatial 
differentiation. This process creates heterogeneity into this 
space, and maritime territories have different features 
depending of their location and spatial content. For 
transportation, this can have effect on the safety and security 
at sea. Some areas within the maritime space facilitate or 
hinder transportation. According to  the spatial features of 
territories, maritime space can ease or reduce transportation 
possibilities. For example, a high traffic density area or a 
stormy weather area in the ocean can reduce the accessibility 
and affects the efficacy of transport. 
 
A. Measuring vulnerability at sea 
 
We aim to measure efficacy to improve knowledge on the 
relationship between the ocean as spatial structure and the 
network as spatial use of this structure. As seen before we will 
use the framework of structural vulnerability defined by 
Gleyze and these measurements: efficacy and solicitation. 
Vulnerability can be access by the difference of efficacy and 
solicitation between a regular configuration of the network 
and a network configuration after disruption. 
 
A disruption causes a deviation of regular use of the spatial 
structure (e.g weather condition). To avoid these impacted 
spaces, ships have to crossed additional distance. According to 
Gleyze[14] efficacy is the total length to reach all nodes into 
the graph. In our study case, we focus on the total length to 
reach ports. 
 
Solicitation is measured by the number of shortest paths 
transiting thought a corposant of the network. Basically, this 
corresponds to the maritime territories crossed by ships. After 
a disruption, territories used for the deviation became shortest 
paths for several destinations, causing a change into the 
maritime territories. This means they are variations into each 
maritime territory. 
 
In maritime transport, additional distance becomes a 
lengthening of the total time of travel. This additional time is 
an extension of the cost of each travel. Time lost has a global 
impact on the economy, by a decrease of transport efficacy. 
To model it, we have to add locations reached during a 
disruption. 
 
B. Creating location into the maritime network 
 
The first step in the process is to create locations within the 
maritime space. These locations are elements that guide and 
influence ships direction and speed during travel. These 
locations do not necessarily have the same ability to influence 
the trip. These are capes, channels, straits, TSS as checkpoints 
for the trip, or barriers for navigation like stormy area or 
piracy zone. Each location within the space can produce 
knowledge on the territory and spatial differentiation. 
 
These constraints are the structural elements of the maritime 
territory. The primary advantage of this approach is to create 
geographic data for a better understanding of maritime 
territories. In this figure(fig), 3 ports are link by the maritime 
space and 3 constraints exist into the space. C1 and C2 are 
checkpoints (TSS, good weather) and C3 a zone to avoid 
(piracy zone). 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Ports and constraints into the maritime space 
 
This methodology is used to provide information on the 
maritime territories to formalize the network. 
 
C. Network formalization 
 
The second step in the process is to link these constraints 
(checkpoints or barriers). A sea route can be defined as a 
directed path between ports of origin and destination with a 
succession of passages and intermediate ports, Paths can be 
defined like a sequence of location to reach or to avoid (in 
case if the barriers is on the shortest path between two nodes):  
 
AB= (A,c1,c2,B) 
AC= (A,c1,C) 
BC= (B,c2,-c3,C) 
 
For example, a trip form port B to port C will start to B, go 
thought node c2, avoid node c3 and reach port C. This step 
formalizes topological structure to the maritime network by 
maritime territory constraints. This formalization allows the 
topological representation of the use of space for transport 
(fig. 4). ). This results in a graph, and represents the maritime 
space and the constraints of territory. Ports, as entry and exit 
door of maritime areas are located outside, and maritime 
constraint are inside the maritime space.  
 
Figure 4. Proposed topological structure of maritime network 
 
D. Measering maritime network vulnerability 
 
From this formalization, the maritime network structure is 
able to measure the vulnerability of the network into the 
maritime space. A disruption corresponds to a change of state 
of attractive constraints into repulsive constraints. Zavitsas [7] 
demonstrate that the strongest disturbances are related to the 
closure of ports and channels (attractive to a repulsive place 
for navigation).  By using structural vulnerability 
measurement established by Gleyze[14] we can assess the 
maritime network. 
 
VI.  FURTHER WORKS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Further works will focus on the modelling of the territory by a 
spatial agent based model, as propose by Langlois[15] to 
highlight effects of constraints in the maritime space. This 
methodology will allow to define territorial behaviors 
(attractive or repulsive for navigation) and to measure the 
influence and territorial dynamics on the navigation. 
 
Indeed, these attractive or repulsive constraints can affect a 
entire territory for navigation and change the constraint degree 
and attraction of a place into the ocean it is possible to know 
the influence of a place on the maritime space. Depending on 
the behavior of the place (checkpoint or absolute barrier), the 
territory can be split into several locator agent. These spatial 
agent can be attractive, repulsive or neutral (no significant 
effect on navigation) depending of the constraints into the 
territories. 
 
Ultimately, the goal of this study is to demonstrate the spatial 
structure effects on spatial behaviors and conversely, spatial 
behaviors change the configuration of the spatial structure. To 
achieve it, multi-agent model will be used to simulate the 
dynamic of territories (attractive and repulsive zones) and its 
possible effects on spatiotemporal behaviors of ships. This can 
contribute to a better comprehension of the worldwide 
maritime network, its formalization and evolution, its 
performance as a spatial mediator, and its impact on the global 
economy. 
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